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Abstract
This paper studies advertising in markets with positive consumption externalities. In such
markets, we show that firms may engage in advertising competition to coordinate consumer
expectations on their own brand as long as they produce goods of similar quality. The firm with
the lower quality product has a greater incentive to advertise. Hence in equilibrium, the lower
quality product will often be more popular.
We would like to thank James Albrecht and Curtis Taylor for their comments on a paper we
presented at the North American Winter Meetings of the Econometric Society in Washington,
D.C.. This paper is a direct result of the issues they raised. We would also like to acknowledge
the assistance and advice of Neil Arnwine. All errors are of course our own.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This paper studies advertising in markets with positive consumption externalities. In markets with
consumption externalities, the value of the product to the consumer does not only depend on the
characteristics of the product but it also depends on the purchasing decisions of other consumers
either due to social interaction or due to network externalities. Reading a best seller gives the
additional pleasure of having common conversation topics with other people. The decision about
which software to purchase is probably not only determined by the relative prices or qualities of
the competing packages. The choice also involves the expectations about which one of the software
packages is going to be more widely adopted. The widely adopted packages have a greater selection
of compatible products developed. The users of popular systems have more people around that can
help with trouble shooting.
In such markets, Pastine and Pastine (2002) show that the firm has incentives to advertise
to convince consumers that its brand will be the popular one. When a consumer observes an
expensive advertising campaign, he realizes that the firm would not have advertised if it did not
expect advertising to increase its sales. Hence it is in the best interest of the individual to purchase
the heavily advertised brand, vindicating the advertising investment of the firm. Clark and
Horstmann (2005) show that this form of advertising survives even when advertising expenditure
is imperfectly observable.
Pastine and Pastine (2002) analyze a market with homogenous products and Clark and
Horstmann (2005) have horizontally differentiated products. In this paper, we allow for vertically
differentiated products. We investigate whether advertising can serve a coordinating function when
goods are of different qualities. We then examine the nature of the advertising competition. We
show that firms may advertise in order to coordinate consumer expectations on their own brand
See Galbraith (1967), Solow (1967), Dixit and Norman (1978), and Becker and Murphy1
(1993).
See Nelson (1974), Butters (1977), Grossman and Shapiro (1984), Kihlstrom and2
Riordan (1984), Milgrom and Roberts (1986), Stegeman (1991), Meurer and Stahl (1994), Robert
and Stahl (1993), Stahl (1994) and Bagwell and Ramey (1994) for informative advertising. 
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only if they produce goods of similar quality. The firm with the lower quality product has a greater
incentive to advertise and the lower quality product will often be more popular.
II. FRAMEWORK
We would like to focus on coordinating advertising in markets with consumption externalities.
Hence we construct a model which abstracts from all previously analyzed roles of advertising. To
abstract from the “persuasive role” of advertising , we assume that consumers are rational and that1
their preferences are constant in the face of advertising.  To abstract from the “informative role”
of advertising, either directly or indirectly through signaling, we assume common knowledge of
the existence, prices and characteristics of the products.2
Consider a market with two brands and a unit continuum of consumers who differ in their
taste (á) for the product . Consumers’ preferences exhibit positive consumption
externalities. The utility the consumer gets from the product is a function of the quality of the
product (V) and it is increasing in the number of the people (q) who purchase the same brand.
Consumers want at most one product from each brand. Thus, if this is the market for books, some
For example, see “The Won and Lost Weekend,” The Economist, November 29, 1997,3
pg. 87. Studios spend up to three quarters of a movie’s promotion budget in the 4-5 days before
it opens.
-3-
consumers may prefer to buy more than one book, but no one will purchase the same book twice.
The utility function exhibits diminishing marginal utility. Consumer i’s indirect utility is given by:
(1)
for j,k0{A,B} and jk, â>0, ù0(0,1). P is the price, â is the consumption externality parameter and
ù yields diminishing marginal utility.
For instance, this specification of consumers seems to be a reasonable approximation in the
market for movies since people like to chat about movies. If a product with positive consumption
externalities has high early sales, later consumers have more incentive to purchase that good and
this snowball effect results in high total sales. This feature of markets with consumption
externalities is consistent with the belief in the movie industry that a firm’s ability to coordinate
consumer expectations on its product during the opening weekend will be crucial to its success.3
In this paper we model purely coordinating advertising with no word-of-mouth communication
about the popularity of the product: Our consumers make their purchasing decisions after firms
advertise but before observing the actions of other consumers. Thus in the movie industry
interpretation, it is advertising aimed at creating high first-weekend sales that is examined.
Two firms (A, B) have the same constant marginal cost, normalized to zero. The products
A Bare of potentially different qualities, V  and V . Without loss of generality we assume throughout
The typical contract between the movie studios and the theaters ties the producer’s4
revenue directly to ticket sales. This risk-sharing arrangement helps to ensure that the studios
have incentives to promote their movies.
 Pastine and Pastine (2002) have a dynamic model with homogeneous consumers where5
firms’ advertising and price decisions are endogenously determined. Nevertheless, avoiding these
interaction effects permits a much clearer understanding of coordinating advertising in markets
with consumption externalities where goods are vertically differentiated.
The analysis of the possible corner solutions in the absence of these assumptions is6
simple but creates numerous sub-cases without adding any intuition or altering the basic
conclusions.
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A Bthat V $V . Both A and B’s products sell at price P. The producer firm captures a percentage
ã0(0,1] of the sales receipts from its product.  4
In the movie industry interpretation, at the retail level, a movie theater typically carries the
products of more than one studio and sells tickets at the same price. That is, at a particular theater
the tickets to a popular movie typically sell for the same price as the tickets to an unpopular one.
We do not attempt to explain this phenomenon but take it as given. We will focus on the role of
advertising abstracting from the interactions between advertising and retail price competition.5
In order to guarantee interior solutions to the consumers’ problem we make two
assumptions on parameter values.  For some of the consumers the product is desirable enough to6
purchase both goods, even in the absence of consumption externalities: . And the
consumption externality is relatively mild so that a consumer who does not care for the product
(á=0) never purchases it just for the externality, even if everybody else is buying it, â<P. Together
these two restrictions on parameter values yield a market which is fundamentally driven by product
value. Consumption externalities are important in this market, but not to the extent that they eclipse
the fundamental value of the product to consumers.
Before analyzing the case with vertically differentiated products (Section IV), we first
A Bexamine a market with products of equal quality, V =V /V. The insights gained about advertising
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competition in the homogenous goods case will then be extended to the vertically differentiated
goods market.
III. EQUAL QUALITIES
A BDue to consumption externalities, there are multiple equilibria when V =V : Consumers can
coordinate on one of the products, or there might be no coordination. 
3.1. Multiplicity of Equilibria
No coordination. A and B are of the same quality and they have the same price. If firms do not
engage in some activity to differentiate their products from each other, consumers may  have no
device to coordinate their expectations about the popularity of the products. Hence in equilibrium,
A Bconsumers may expect that A and B will sell the same quantity E(q )=E(q )=q.
Since consumers differ in their taste for the product, while some may choose not to
purchase either of the items, others may purchase one item and the consumers who have a high
taste for the product may purchase both items.  A consumer purchases a second item only if the
additional benefit from the second product is higher than the price, áùV+âq$P. Hence people with
high enough taste  will buy A and B. Since á-U[0,  ], the proportion of people who buy
_
á
both of the products is given by 
A consumer will not buy either of the products if his marginal benefit from the first
purchase is less than the price,  So consumers with a low taste for the good ,
will not buy either of the products. Hence, the proportion of people that purchase a single product
is 
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People who decide to buy only one item are indifferent between A and B, so they split between the
products. Hence the proportion of people that buy a particular product is given by the proportion
of consumers that purchase both items plus half of the proportion of consumers that purchase one
item. This yields the equilibrium number of people who purchase each good:
(2)
Solving for q,
(3)
   
since P>â. And since  > . As the price goes up, quantity demanded goes down. An
_
á
increase in the consumption externality parameter â leads to an increase in the quantity demanded.
Coordinated Demand Equilibria. Suppose that consumers believe that firm j will sell more than
j kfirm k, E(q )>E(q ) j,k 0{A,B} where jk. Since all else is equal, consumers would prefer j’s
product due to the consumption externalities. Consumers who purchase k, are the ones who
purchase both j and k. A consumer purchases the second item k if the additional benefit from k is
khigher than the price, áùV+âq $P. The proportion of people who buy k is then given by:          
  (4)
kSolving for q  yields:
_    q (5)
jConsumers whose marginal benefit from the first purchase is higher than price buy j, áV+âq$P.
So people with  purchase j. The proportion of the people who purchase j is:
 (6)
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j  Solving for q  yields:
(7)
_Inspection of (5) and (7) reveals that  >q  since P>â and ù<1. The product that faces the
_
q
coordinated demand sells more due to consumption externalities. The proportion of people that buy
j in the coordinated demand equilibrium is greater than the proportion of people that buy j when
there is no coordination, . The proportion of people that buy k declines when consumers
_coordinate on j compared to the case where there is no coordination, q  . 
3.2. The Role of Advertising
There is an equilibrium where consumers coordinate on A and there is also an equilibrium where
consumers coordinate on B. Firms have preferences over these possible equilibria. Thus, firms may
try to differentiate themselves via advertising to coordinate consumer expectations on their own
brand.
In light of the multiplicity of equilibria, imagine a consumer who observes an advertising
campaign. The consumer could suppose either that the advertising was a mistake, or that
advertising will lead to increased sales. And in fact there are several equilibria so either set of
expectations is rational. But they are not equally plausible as general predictions of consumer
behavior. If a firm invests in advertising it must believe that advertising increases sales, and
consumers are likely to take this into account when forming their own expectations. For consumers
Firms in markets with significant consumption externalities often try to encourage this7
type of reasoning. In the early months of 1995, during the height of its advertising campaign for
OS/2, IBM frequently cited its $500 million investment in the operating system. When Windows
95 was launched in August 1995, Microsoft widely publicized that it was spending $200 million
on advertising alone. See, for example, Panettieri (1995) and Rebello and Kuntz (1995).
The all-pay auction form has been analyzed by Tullock (1980), Hillman and Riley (1989)8
and Baye et al. (1993,1996).  The proofs used here are adapted from Ellingsen (1991).  General
statements on expected payoffs can be found in Baye, Kovenock and De Vries (1993).  All-pay
auctions have been widely used to model lobbying for monopoly rents, R&D races, political
campaigns, tournaments and job promotion.
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to ignore advertising in forming their expectations they must treat all observed advertising as costly
mistakes by firms.7
3.3. The Nature of Advertising Competition
Let us momentarily postulate that the firm that advertises more heavily can coordinate consumers
on its own brand, and find the equilibrium in the advertising competition. Using this we will then
argue that this is likely to be the equilibrium outcome: It is indeed rational for the consumer to
prefer to purchase the more heavily advertised product.             
Abstracting from all other functions of advertising, when the only role of advertising is to
coordinate consumer expectations, advertising competition has the same form as the first-price all-
pay auction.  In a first-price all-pay auction all participants must pay their bids regardless of8
whether they win the auction or not, and the highest bidder receives the prize. In our framework,
the more heavily advertised brand (the firm with the highest bid in the form of advertising expense)
can capture the popular brand position. The value of winning the auction for a firm is the difference
in the profits the firm would get if consumers coordinate on its product versus if consumers
coordinate on the rival’s product. If a firm out advertises its rival, its sales are given by (7) and if
its competitor out advertises it, its sales are given by (5). Therefore the value of “winning” the
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advertising competition (Ã) to each firm over and above the value of losing is given by the
_difference between these quantities ,  and q , times the price of the product, times the share of
_
q
sales which goes to the producer:
(8)
Since the firms’ problems are symmetric, the value of winning the advertising competition is the
same for both producers.
In this section we will derive the properties of the equilibrium. Lemmas 1-4 below will also
be employed when we discuss the case of vertically differentiated products. While  when
goods are homogenous, this will not be the case when goods  are of different qualities. In the next
section we will show that the value of winning the advertising competition is higher for the low
quality product firm; . To avoid repetition, Lemmas 1-4 are established for  even
though in the homogenous product case we only need the arguments for . 
Lemma 1: Neither firm will put a probability mass point on any advertising level greater than zero
A Bwhen Ã #Ã  .
i BProof: Define a range A  as (0,x) where x is an arbitrary number greater than Ã . Suppose the
ilowest mass point of firm i in A  is given by  Then firm j would not put any probability at
as a slight increase in his advertising would result in a discrete increase in the probability
of winning. As there is no probability of  firm i could lower his advertising slightly without
changing his probability of winning. ~
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Lemma 2: Both firms have infimum advertising levels of zero. The expected value of the game to
A Bfirm A is zero when Ã #Ã .
AProof:   Firm A will never advertise more than Ã . By Lemma 1, there is zero probability of A
A Aadvertising exactly Ã  so firm B will never advertise greater than Ã . Since there can be no
A Aprobability mass at Ã  by Lemma 1, each firms’ infimum advertising level must be less than Ã .
Suppose that firm i has an infimum advertising level of   Then firm j would never
choose  If he did he would be paying a positive amount and would lose for sure, since
by Lemma 1, the probability of firm i choosing exactly is zero in this range. Therefore firm i
could lower its infimum advertising level without changing the probability of winning. 
If firm A had an expected value from the game greater than zero, it would have to have a
non-zero probability of winning at its infimum advertising level since all advertising levels in the
support of the mixed strategy must yield the same expected payoff.  From Lemma 1 this would
imply that firm B would be putting a probability mass at zero advertising.  If so firm A would never
advertise zero since it could gain a discrete increase its probability of winning at negligible cost by
advertising just slightly more than zero.  Thus firm B would lose with certainty with zero
advertising, yielding a payoff of zero.  In this candidate equilibrium firm B would be earning zero
expected profits and A would be earning positive expected profits so its suprimum advertising level
Awould have to be strictly below Ã .  In that case firm B could raise its advertising to just above A’s
suprimum level and make positive expected profits.  Hence in equilibrium the expected value of
the game to firm A must be zero. ~
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A B ALemma 3: When Ã #Ã , both firms have a suprimum advertising level of Ã .  The expected value
B A A Bof the game to firm B is Ã -Ã . Hence when Ã =Ã  the expected value of the game to firm B is zero.
Proof: If firm B had a suprimum level of advertising of  firm A could win for sure with
that level of advertising since by Lemma 1 the probability of firm B choosing exactly is zero.
However this would result in a positive payoff for A, a contradiction of Lemma 2.
Suppose that firm A had a suprimum advertising level of  Then firm B would
never set  as he can win for sure with that level of advertising since by Lemma 1 the
probability of firm A choosing exactly is zero.  A contradiction of the first part of the proof of
this lemma.
Firm B wins for sure with his suprimum advertising level since by Lemma 1 the probability
Aof firm A choosing exactly that level is zero.  Since Ã  is in the support of his mixed strategy and
B Ahe wins for sure with that advertising level, the expected payoff for firm B is Ã -Ã . 
~
Lemma 4: Each firm must have positive probability almost everywhere on  when
A BÃ #Ã .
Proof: Suppose there were an interval (t, s) in where firm i had zero probability of advertising.
Then firm j would have zero probability of advertising in that interval since it could lower its
advertising to t and have the same chance of winning. But in this case firm i would never bid 
as he could lower his advertising to t, saving in advertising costs and losing only the
probability that j advertises in the range   By Lemma 1 the loss in probability is
negligible for small  ~
See Hillman and Riley (1989) or Ellingsen (1991) for the full derivation of equilibrium9
strategies. The literature on all-pay auctions is extensive. With more than two players there may
not be a unique equilibrium, but the result on the costs for the two players with the highest
valuation can be obtained across all equilibria, see Baye, Kovenock and De Vries (1993).
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Proposition 1: When goods are of equal qualities, no pure-strategy equilibrium exists. The mixed-
strategy equilibrium involves almost everywhere continuous mixed strategies where both firms mix
Ain the range [0,Ã ]. The advertising competition results in the expected dissipation of all gains to
advertising. 
Proof: From Lemma 1 there can be no pure-strategy equilibrium with advertising levels greater
than zero.  If firm A is playing a pure strategy of zero advertising then firm B would play a pure
strategy of advertising just above zero, winning for sure with negligible advertising expenses.  This
would contradict Lemma 1, hence there can be no pure-strategy equilibrium. Both firms have
Acontinuous mixed strategies almost everywhere on  [0,Ã ] by Lemma 4.  Expected values of the
advertising competition for each firm are zero by Lemmas 2 and 3 .9
 ~
Ex-ante each firm is indifferent between advertising and simply allowing the other to
capture the coordinated demand. While the actualized profit of the firm depends on the outcome
of the mixed-strategy equilibrium, the expected profit is simply equal to the profit that the firm
would get if it passively allowed its rival to coordinate consumer expectations on its product. In
_this case, the firm’s sales would be given by q which is strictly less than the sales the firm would
get if neither firm advertised,  Thus both firms would be better off if they could agree not to
advertise. However, each would have an incentive to cheat on such an agreement. If the rival were
not to advertise then the firm could coordinate consumer expectations on its product with a
minimal advertising expense and capture sales of  which are strictly higher than the sales it could
_
q
get if it abided by the agreement.
Due to advertising more people buy at least one product (a business creation effect). When
consumers coordinate their expectations on a brand, positive consumption externality creates an
additional incentive for the consumers to buy that brand. In the movie industry interpretation this
-13-
means that even people who do not enjoy movies very much go to the movies, since they expect
to socialize with more people. Without coordination, only people with á  purchase the good.
With coordination all the people with á  go to the movies, where since
Due to advertising, fewer people buy the less advertised product (a business stealing effect).
Without advertising consumers who were going to purchase one item would split between the
products. With advertising the firm with lower advertising no longer gets these customers. It only
captures consumers who value the good enough to purchase both. Hence, the incentive to purchase
_the second item declines.  From (3) and (5),  q
Also notice that total quantity sold goes down (a business dissipation effect). Total sales
when there is no advertising is the summation of the demand for A and demand for B, given by 
_When one firm advertises more than the other, one gets  and the other gets q. There is a reduction
_
q
in the total sales,
_q + (9)
With coordination, one firm has high demand and the other has low demand. Hence the incentive
for a consumer to buy his first product increases, and the incentive to buy his second decreases. But
since the consumer has diminishing marginal utility from the consumption of the product, the
intrinsic value of the second purchase is less important relative to the consumption externality than
it is for the first purchase. Hence coordination increases the sales of highly advertised product less
than it decreases the sales for the less advertised product.
As a result of the stochastic nature of the advertising competition, ex-post the firm which
is out advertised will have regrets. But the consumer will realize that firms advertise because they
expect advertising to increase their sales. So the individual consumer will realize that firms believe
that advertising is being used as a coordination device, and that firms are confident enough about
this belief to invest large sums of money. Hence it will in fact be in the best interest of a consumer
to buy the more heavily advertised brand. In aggregate, this leads to higher sales, higher
An individual who is purchasing both goods will always purchase A first since10
A B B AV +ùV >V +ùV .
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consumption externalities and hence greater consumer surplus from the more heavily advertised
product.
IV. VERTICAL DIFFERENTIATION
In markets with vertical differentiation consumers can learn about the qualities of the products
based on trusted critics. Computer magazines rate the qualities of software packages. There are
consumer reports on the reliability of different brand name automobiles. In the movie industry,
Reinstein and Snyder (2005) find that reviews have a large and significant effect on consumers’
expectation of film quality. We assume that qualities of the products are common knowledge and
A BV >V . We first examine whether multiple equilibria exist when one product is of superior quality.
We then discuss the role of advertising as a coordination device in markets with vertically
differentiated products.
Coordinate on A. Suppose that consumers believe that more people will purchase A. Then the
consumer prefers A for two reasons.  First, he expects to enjoy A more due to its higher quality.
Secondly, he expects to derive higher consumption externalities from A. The only consumers that
end up buying B are the ones who purchase both of the products. The second item  yields10
B Badditional surplus equal to (áùV +âq -P). Therefore, consumers with   buy B. Since
Bá-U[0,  ], solving for the equilibrium q ,
_
á
(10)
BSince P>â, 0<q <1.
Everyone with a positive consumer surplus from A, with á such that , buys A.
ASolving for the equilibrium q ,
     (11)    
A B A B.since V  > V , sales of A are greater than the sales of B, q >q  
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Coordinate on B. Can it be rational for consumers to believe that the lower quality product B will
A Bbe more popular? Below we will show that E(q )<E(q ) is only rational when A and B are of
similar qualities. If the quality difference between the two products is too large, then the
B Aexpectation that q >q  is not rational, and hence there is no multiplicity of equilibria. Only when
products are of similar qualities may advertising have a coordinating role to play in this market.
If consumer i believes that the lower quality product will sell more, then the product that
the consumer prefers to buy depends on the consumer’s taste for the intrinsic value of the good. For
i i A A i B Bhigh á  such that á V +âq >á V +âq  , consumer i would prefer the high-quality product A. Define
á as the critical level where a consumer is indifferent between A and B if he is buying his first item:~
(12)
Consumers with á $á prefer A over B, due to its high quality, and consumers with á< á prefer B~ ~
over A, due to the consumption externality. 
i iDefine á' such that if á  is low (á <á'), consumer i will not buy either of the products. Define
i iá" such that if á  is high (á >á"), he buys both of the products. The critical values á' and á" will be
iderived shortly. If á  takes an intermediate value, he will buy one, and the one he
ichooses will depend on the relationship between á  and á. There are three potential cases á#á',~ ~
B Aá'<á#á", and á>á". We will show that the only possibility for rational expectations of q >q  is in~ ~
the third case where the parameter values are such that  á>á".~
B AThe first case (á#á') directly implies that q <q  and so the consumers’ expectations that~
B Aq >q  are not rational. The second case (á'<á#á") is less obvious, but is also not possible in~
iequilibrium. To see this notice that in this case everyone with á$á will buy A so,~
. Solving for the quantity firm A sells, .  This yields
A B Aq $1, so if the parameters are such that á#á"consumer expectations of q >q  are not rational.~
B AThus the only possibility for rational expectations of q >q  is if á>á". As before, á" is~
where the consumer’s additional benefit from buying two items instead of one is just equal to the
price of the product. If the consumer buys only one item he will buy B. The net benefit from
i B Bpurchasing one item is therefore á V +âq -P. The net benefit from two items is equal to
. Hence the additional net benefit from buying the second item
-16-
is equal to . The additional net benefit from purchasing the second item
iis zero for the consumer with á =á",
(13)
The only consumers who buy A are those who value the good so much that they buy both A and
i AB (á >á"). Therefore q  is given by, 
 (14)
Asolving for q ,
(15)
A Aq 0(0,1) since P>â and   ùV >P.
_
á
B BConsumers whose net benefit from purchasing B is positive, áV +âq -P>0 buy B. This
yields the critical value á', 
     (16)
i BAll consumers with á >á' purchase B, therefore q  is given by,
(17)
Bsolving for q ,
 (18)
B Bq 0(0,1) since P>â, and   ùV >P. Thus,
_
á
(19)
B A B A Bq >q  if (1-ù)V > (V -V ).
These results also require that á"<á which imposes the condition,~
   (20)
A B ASubstituting in q  from (15) and (q -q ) from (19) and rearranging (20) yields,
       (21)
(21) is the necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of an equilibrium where consumers
coordinate on the low-quality good.  If the quality difference between the two products is too large,
B Athen the expectation that q >q  is not rational, and advertising will not have a coordinating role to
play in this market.
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Proposition 2: If the quality difference between the products is too large we will not observe
advertising for coordination purposes.
Proof: If the qualities of the two goods are very different –  loosely speaking, one movie receives
two thumbs up, the other two thumbs down, formally  – there is only one
equilibrium and it involves consumers coordinating on the high-quality good. In this case, everyone
who buys a product purchases the higher quality one, and only those people who really like the
product will purchase the lower quality one as well. Suppose B is a very low-quality brand but that
firm B did advertise. Because B is so poor, there is no rational expectations equilibrium where
consumers coordinate on B. In this situation, purchasing the higher quality product is the only
reasonable behavior, and consumers will coordinate on the higher quality product, even if faced
with advertising for the low-quality product. Hence rational firms will choose not to advertise when
the quality difference between the products is too large. ~
When there are significant quality differences, there is no multiplicity of equilibria and
firms cannot coordinate consumer expectations using advertising. Hence the quality assessments,
such as movie reviews,  are serving an informative role, but also, implicitly, they are serving a
coordinating function. 
From (21), notice that advertising may serve a coordinating role when the consumption
externality (â) is large. If the consumption externality is small, the quality of the products becomes
relatively more important in the purchasing decisions of the consumers, and the coordinating
function is served by quality differences. If the importance of quality versus externality is high,
advertising will not coordinate consumer expectations.
When the quality difference between the products is not too drastic, that is for parameter
values where (21) holds, coordination via product quality may be difficult to achieve. Of course,
if all else is equal it is quite natural for consumers to coordinate on the high-quality good. However,
the producer of the low-quality good has strong incentives to ensure that all else is not equal. The
fundamental problem is that there are two equilibria, and each individual consumer must try to
predict which equilibrium the other consumers are going to play.
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There is a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium where consumers coordinate on the high-
quality product and ignore all advertising. In this equilibrium firms would not advertise. Notice that
for this equilibrium to survive, the off-equilibrium beliefs must be such that consumer interpret any
positive level of advertising as irrational behavior of the firm. Now suppose that the producer of
the lower quality product does actually mount a costly advertising campaign. An individual
consumer could suppose that the firm engages in the advertising campaign because it has
information that consumers use advertising to coordinate their expectations on one of the equilibria.
In this case, a consumer who is going to buy only one product would prefer B, firm B’s sales would
increase, vindicating its investment in advertising. Therefore, when the quality of the products are
not too dissimilar, information on product quality may not be the deciding factor in coordinating
consumer expectations. However, it will have a very significant effect on the incentives that the
two firms face in their advertising competition.
Proposition 3: The value of winning the advertising competition is higher for the firm with the
low-quality product.
Proof: The value of winning the advertising competition for a firm is proportional to the difference
in sales when it coordinates consumers on its brand versus when the rival captures the coordinated
demand. So for A the value of winning the advertising competition is proportional to the difference
between (11) and (15):
(22)
For B, the value of winning the advertising competition is proportional to the difference between
(10) and (18):
     (23)
A BThe numerators of (22) and (23) are the same but the denominator of (23) is small since V >V .
Hence the value of winning the advertising competition is higher for firm B. 
~
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A is the higher quality product. Even when it does not coordinate consumers on its brand
it still sells well due to its high quality. If A coordinates demand, B only gets a low level of sales
due to its low quality. Moving from this low demand to the coordinated demand yields a big change
in sales for B. Hence the value of winning the advertising competition is higher for the low-quality
product firm.
Coordinating advertising competition when firms have vertically differentiated products
has the same form as an all-pay auction where bidders have asymmetric valuations. 
Proposition 4: When goods are vertically differentiated, no pure-strategy equilibrium exists. The
mixed-strategy equilibrium involves almost everywhere continuous mixed strategies where both
Afirms mix in the range [0,Ã ]. The advertising competition results in the expected dissipation of all
gains to advertising for the high quality firm and the expected value of the competition is equal to
B AÃ - Ã >0 for the low quality firm. 
Proof: As in the homogenous products case, from Lemma 1 there can be no pure-strategy
equilibrium with advertising levels greater than zero. If firm A is playing a pure strategy of zero
advertising then firm B would play a pure strategy of advertising just above zero. And zero
advertising would not be best response of A. Hence there can be no pure-strategy equilibrium. Both
Afirms have continuous mixed strategies almost everywhere on  [0,Ã ] by Lemma 4.  The expected
value of the advertising competition for firm A is zero by Lemma 2. The expected value of the
B Aadvertising competition for firm B is Ã - Ã  by Lemma 3.  This expression is positive by
Proposition 3. ~
AFirm A would never bid higher than the value of the auction Ã . Firm B could always win the
Acompetition by bidding slightly higher than Ã  and collect the prize. This leaves B with an
advantage in the advertising competition equal to the difference in valuations. In equilibrium it is
able to capture an expected profit from the advertising competition equal to 
While the firm with the low-quality product strictly prefers to engage in advertising
competition, the expected profit created by entering the advertising competition for the firm with
the high-quality product is equal to zero.  The firm with the high-quality product is indifferent
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between entering the competition or not. However it would not be an equilibrium strategy for A
not to enter the competition: Any announcement suggesting that A will not advertise would not be
credible. Hence in equilibrium both firms will advertise. The outcome of the advertising
competition will be stochastic. Sometimes we will observe the producer of the high-quality product
advertising more, and other times we will observe the producer of the low-quality product
advertising more.   
Proposition 5: The firm with the low-quality product is more likely to win the advertising
competition. As long as quality difference is not too drastic consumers will more often coordinate
on the low-quality product.
AProof: Define G (a) as the probability of firm A having an advertising level less than or equal to
B‘a’. And G (a) represents firm B’s cumulative probability distribution. The expected value of the
advertising competition to firm A is zero by Proposition 4. So when firm A advertises ‘a’,  the
expected value created due to advertising competition for firm A is given by:
B A B0 = G (a) ( Ã  - a) + (1 - G (a)) (- a) (24)
BSolving for G (a) yields:
      (25)
B AThe expected value of the advertising competition to firm B is given by Ã - Ã . When firm B
advertises ‘a’, the expected value created due to advertising competition for firm B is given by:
B A A B AÃ -Ã = G (a) (Ã  - a) + (1 - G (a)) (- a ) (26)
ASolving for G (a) yields:
(27)
The probability of firm A winning the advertising competition is given by the probability
that A advertises ‘a’ times the probability that B advertises less than ‘a’, integrated over the support
of the mixed strategy:
(28)
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Similarly, the probability of coordinating on B is given by:
   (29)
B ASince Ã > Ã , the probability that consumers coordinate on the low-quality product is higher than
the probability that consumers coordinate on the high-quality product. ~
This for instance implies that consumers will watch many mediocre movies just for the
consumption externality. Nevertheless, the movies with the highest sales will be the high-quality
movies that are highly publicized. If quality differences are significant, the high-quality product
will get the coordinated demand and in equilibrium we will not observe coordinating advertising.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In markets with consumption externalities , firms might engage in advertising competition not only
to inform the consumers, or to persuade them that one brand is somehow intrinsically different
from other brands, but also to convince them that others will be buying it as well. It is plausible,
for example, that the large advertising campaign for Windows 95 was not merely an attempt to
inform consumers of the existence and price of the product, but it was also a device to coordinate
consumer expectations on Windows 95.
 The paper predicts that in markets with consumption externalities, when quality differences
are not too great, consumers may often knowingly purchase the lower quality product. When
Windows 95 and OS/2 were being introduced to the market, most of the software reviewers agreed
that OS/2 was of slightly higher quality than Windows 95. However Microsoft managed to
coordinate consumer expectations on Windows 95. IBM complained  about having lost market
share to Microsoft despite their higher quality. This paper suggests that OS/2 would have not lost
the battle if it was of significantly superior quality. The quality difference between these products
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must have been small enough that consumers chose to enjoy consumption externalities at the cost
of a slight decline in the product quality.   
In the models of asymmetric information of Kihlstorm and Riordon (1984) and Ippolito
(1990), the theoretically predicted correlation between quality and advertising is positive. In a
repeat purchase framework, the firm with higher quality has higher incentives to advertise, since
the potential buyer would engage in repeat purchase of the high-quality good. However, empirically
Bagwell (2007) reports in his survey article that studies do not offer strong evidence for the
hypothesis of a positive association between quality and advertising. We show that the theoretically
predicted correlation between advertising and quality is weakly negative when advertising serves
as a coordination device in markets with consumption externalities. The equilibrium of the
advertising competition is in mixed strategies. While there will be times where the high-quality
product has higher advertising, more frequently it will be the low-quality product that will capture
the higher advertising position.
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